Strategic Denial of Resources

This time, I want to examine a current event in the context of strategy.  

First, some background.

On Monday, November 15, 2021, the Defence Ministry of Russia launched a ground-based missile which destroyed a long-defunct Russian satellite in orbit.  The satellite had ceased operating in 1982.  Russian missile, Russian (Soviet) satellite . . .  what’s the big deal?  Boom!  It’s gone!

Except it isn’t.  

Here’s why this IS a big deal.  Estimates vary, but the debris from the explosion of the satellite, and the missile launched to destroy it, has generated hundreds of broken pieces travelling at great speed in all manner of directions.   Ok.  So space is big, and empty . . .  so what.  

Except it isn’t.  

There are well over 3,000 active satellites orbiting the earth at this time serving functions including communications, weather monitoring, earth observation, military intelligence, and navigation (Global Positioning – GPS).  Things we have all come to take for granted and even rely upon.  

And now, there are hundreds of pieces of “shrapnel” — fast moving bits of metal — in their own random orbits zooming by those billions of dollars of delicate instruments every hour or two.  

On a more personal, human level, there are also anywhere from nine to fourteen people in either the International Space Station (ISS) and the more recent Chinese space station.  In fact, within hours of the destruction of the Russian satellite, the crew of the ISS was asked to secure the station by closing hatches and take refuge in their respective return capsules until the “cloud” of debris passed.  

That cloud of the bits and pieces of metal, etc. that made up the satellite and the missile will come by again, and again, spreading out over a larger and less predictable volume.  Each one becoming a potential “bullet,” or “cannonball,” moving at around 27,000 kph (17,000 mph) or 8 kilometres per second! threatening the satellites and space stations.

Except that’s perhaps not the worst of it.

In addition to the 3,300 active satellites, there are at least another 3,000 inactive satellites — broken, turned off, or out of “gas.”  And then there are the many spent rocket stages that delivered all of these to orbit.  Furthermore, humans have been launching things into orbit for over 60 years now.  Some of these blew up on their own, some collided and broke up into many pieces, and some were destroyed intentionally by nations testing their own anti-satellite weapons.  It is now estimated that there are literally millions of pieces of this “junk” varying in size from larger rocket stages down to flecks of paint and the occasional lost bolt or wrench.  

So why is this important?  It’s a “numbers game.”  All of this “stuff” has the potential to collide, and when it does, it does so with such force that it breaks into many more pieces. The more pieces, the more collisions.  The more collisions, the more pieces.  This scenario, named the “Kessler Syndrome” after the NASA scientist who first described and modelled the possibility, states that once there are enough fragments and debris in orbit, the number of collisions will ensure that the amount of debris will increase exponentially, beyond all possibility of control or even mitigation.  

Potentially all functioning satellites could be destroyed, including the space stations and it would be impossible for any space vehicle to make it through the “killing zone” of earth orbit.

There would be no satellite communications, no earth observations, no weather forecasting based on information from orbit, no GPS on your smart phone . . . and no astronauts or exploration beyond the earth.  For a long time.  It could take decades, perhaps many, before enough pieces had fallen to earth, and before orbital space would be relatively safe again.  

Could this really happen?  The computer modelling says yes.  And there have already been collisions over the years between debris and active satellites that have destroyed them.  

Ok.  That’s the background.  So why did they do it?  Was it a mistake?  The Russians have their own cosmonauts on board the ISS.  An important percentage of the station was built and maintained by them.  In fact, the Russians were essential to its continuing existence.  Between 2011, when the shuttle was retired, and 2020, when Spacex started flying astronauts, the Russians were the only way anyone, including the Americans, Europeans, and Canadians, could get to the space station.  Surely, they would not knowingly put their own people’s lives and their investment in the ISS in jeopardy!  

The Russians also have their own GPS network, military satellites, and communication satellites in orbit.  All that was put in danger.  Would they knowingly risk it?  Didn’t it have  to be some kind of mistake?

In fact, officially the Russians insist that this incident poses no risk and imply that the reactions otherwise are just political posturing.  The Russian Ministry of Defence stated: 

“ . . . the fragments emerging after the defunct Tselina-D Soviet-era satellite was destroyed during the tests will not pose any threat to orbital stations, satellites and space activity.

Meanwhile, in the U.S., Sue Gordon, former principal deputy director of national intelligence responded by saying: 

“No one understands the space environment as well as Russia does, so let’s not be confused about whether they didn’t understand the likely impact of their action,” she said. “It’s not that they didn’t understand orbital dynamics or that they didn’t understand what was happening in that band,” Gordon added. “These are very experienced space actors.”

Some have speculated that it is a case of “the left hand not knowing what the right hand is doing” — a lack of communication between Russia’s civil versus military space departments.  Perhaps, but that would be indicative of a major breakdown in coordination.

There is another, more disturbing, and strategic, possibility.  

One dark theory is that Russian President Vladimir Putin has now concluded that Russia’s space industry has fallen hopelessly behind the United States and China, and the gap will only further widen in future years. Because of this strategic and economic disadvantage, Putin has calculated that the best option for Russia is to deny certain orbits to these competitors. With Monday’s test, then, he sent his counterparts a message that he still retains some control in space—what you can destroy, Putin believes, you can control.”

– Eric Berger, Ars Technica  

arstechnica.com/science/2021/11/russia-acknowledges-anti-satellite-test-but-says-its-no-big-deal/

Examining this, it seems possible.  Russia, today, has only a relatively small number of active (still functioning) satellites in orbit — 176.  In contrast, the U.S. currently has over 1,900 active satellites; China over 400; and the rest of the world about 900.  Russia’s adversaries have a lot more to lose if their orbital assets are wiped out.  Not only do those satellites represent literally billions of dollars in both their construction and launch costs, certainly over a trillion dollars in total, but their ongoing economic value would be even greater.  

Remember, also, that some of those satellites are very expensive military intelligence satellites — literally strategically crucial “eyes in the sky.”  

Meanwhile Russia’s budget for space has been shrinking.  Due to corruption, even less of that budget gets to intended programs.  There have also been widespread stories of skilled scientists and technicians leaving the programs due to low pay.  As a result, Russia hasn’t been able to keep up with either the U.S. or the ambitious Chinese.

In essence, with their own ability to effectively leverage their own space assets declining, it is possible that they see that their best strategy is to deny the orbital environment to their rivals.  At minimum they are at least demonstrating that they have the will to do so.  This potential leverage has become more important as Russia masses troops near the border with Ukraine.  

This kind of strategic action has, in the past, been called “Scorched Earth” and while others have done it, there are a number of precedents for this in Russian history.  Best known are during Napoleon’s failed march on Moscow in 1812 and the German army’s invasion during the Second World War.  Russia (Soviet Union) carried out these Scorched Earth campaigns — destroying crops, infrastructure, industry, and even whole towns — at great sacrifice to their own nation and people.  The memory of it is literally “burned” into their cultural memory, and with it, the memory that it worked.  

It would actually be surprising if they didn’t still consider it an acceptable strategic tool.